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CHOOSING SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: A DISCUSSION OF 

"CHOICE," "RIGHTS" AND THE NEW 

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIESt 

April L. Cherry* 
For to survive in the mouth of this dragon we call America, we have 
had to learn this first and most vital lesson - that we were never 
meant to survive. Not as human beings. 
AUDRE LoRDE, The Transformation of Silence 
into Language and Action, in SISTER OUTSIDER 
40, 42 (1984). 
lNTRODUCTION 
In the above quoted passage, Audre Lorde explains the impor­
tance ofspeaking, even in the most difficult of circumstances. She has 
taught us that our silence does not protect us. She has written: "Be­
cause the machine will try to grind you into dust anyway, whether or 
not we speak. We can sit in our corners mute forever while our sisters 
and our selves are ·wasted ... ; we can sit in our safe corners mute as 
bottles, and we will still be no less afraid."1 It is in this spirit that I 
offer my thoughts about the limits of choice rhetoric and rights-talk in 
the context ofwomen and reproduction. For it is often noted by femi­
nists that to criticize the foundation ofwomen's reproductive rights is 
to not fully comprehend the fragility ofwomen's current reproductive 
rights, and to give fodder to those who wish to further restrict such 
t This paper is an expanded version of the speech that Professor Cherry 
presented at the National Women Law Students' Association Conference, entitled 
Consensus and the Community: Diversifying Our Points of Vzew, at the University of 
WISconsin Law School on March l, 1996. 
Editor's No~ For Professor Cherry's complete article on this topic, see 10 Wrs. 
WOMEN'S LJ. 161 (1996). 
* Assistant Professor ofLaw, Florida State University College ofLaw. AB., Vassar 
College;J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank Lucinda Finley, Catharine Mac­
Kinnon, and Harlon Dalton, who, as my teachers, saved my sanity, by being there, by 
telling me and those like me that we weren't crazy, and by teaching their students that 
the lives of women of all races and ethnicities, lesbians and gay men, and communi­
ties of color are important, and that issues that affect our lives are integral to legal 
education. Many thanks to Meg Baldwin, Beth Gammie, and Ann McGinley for their 
friendship and support; M.D. Miles for her patience in listening to me read drafts of 
this paper; Melanie Stewart for her excellent research; and Kim Epstein, University of 
WISconsin School of Law, Class of 1996, who pulled off a wonderful conference. 
I. AUDRE LoRDE, The Transfurmation ofSilence into Language and Action, in SISTER 
OursmER 40, 42 (1984). 
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rights.2 I 1:Iust that silence will not save us. However, giving voice to 
our values and our concerns about women's subordination will, at the 
very least, do us no harm. 
CHOICE RHETORIC 
Often feminist discussions regarding contraceptives, sterilization, 
abortion, and the newer emerging reproductive technologies, such as 
artificial insemination,3 in vitro fertilization4 and even contract preg­
nancy5 are framed around or based in the rhetoric of "choice" and 
2. See, e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow, Test Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?, 8 W0­
MEN's RIGHTS RPT. 303, 306 (1985) (book review) (the critiques of sex-selective abor­
tions could easily be used to support the anti-abortion movement). 
3. Artificial insemination involves the introduction of fresh or formerly frozen 
sperm into the uterus or vagina of a woman through the use of a catheter or "turkey 
baster" in order to attempt to produce a pregnancy. The sperm has been collected 
from a man who has masturbated and ejaculated and whose sperm is collected for the 
purpose of artificial insemination. This type of insemination is deemed "artificial" 
because it is non-coital. 
4. In order to produce a pregnancy through in-vitro fertilization ("!VF"), a wo­
man's ovaries are stimulated (hyper-ovulated) with powerful fertility drugs, such as 
Clomid, to produce multiple ripened ova. These ova are removed from the woman's 
ovaries surgically, through laparoscopy, or non-surgically, through a transvaginal re­
trieval method. The American Fertility Soc'y, In-Vitro Fertilization - Embryo Transfer 
(IVF-ET) in the United States IVF-ETRegi,stry: 1989 Result, 55 FERTILI'lY AND STERTII..I'lY 14, 
15 (1991). A sperm "donation" is received from a man who has masturbated and 
whose ejaculatory material has been collected. The ova and sperm are combined in a 
petri dish. Fertilization occurs and the resulting embryos are inseminated into either 
the donating woman's uterus or into the uterus of another woman. If the embryos 
implant into the uterine wall of the receiving woman, then a pregnancy begins. See 
generally, Lori B. Andrews and Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 
623 (1991). Studies have shown that IVF results in live birth in only 10% of the cases 
at the best clinic. Id. at 644; WoMEN UNDER ArrACK: V1croRIES, BACKLASH AND THE 
FIGHT FoR REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, 33 (Susan E. Davis ed., 1988); see also PATRICIA 
SPALLONE, BEYOND CONCEPTION: THE NEW Pounc.s OF REPRODUCTION 63 (1989) (In 
1985, the live birth percentage per IVF treatment cycle was 8.5 percent.). Children 
born as a result of IVF have a higher incident of severe genetic abnormalities, includ­
ing spina bifida, than children born without the use of such technologies. See, e.g., 
Andrews and Douglass, supra at 649-51; see generally, GENA COREA, THE MoTIIER 
MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARIFICIAL INSEMINATION To ARTIFICIAL 
WOMBS (1985). 
5. Contract pregnancy is also known as surrogate motherhood. It takes one of 
two forms. Traditionally, a woman is paid to be inseminated with the sperm of the 
man who pays her. The woman agrees to gestate and birth the fetus and to terminate 
her parental rights to the resulting child in favor of the man who paid her and some­
times his wife. In this form of contract pregnancy, the birth mother is the genetic 
mother of the resulting child. In the second form of contract pregnancy, "gestational 
surrogacy," a woman is paid to be inseminated with the embryo of a contracting 
couple, who have already had their sperm and ova joined in vitro. In this form of 
contract pregnancy, the resulting child is not genetically related to its birth mother. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that the child born to a "gestational" mother has two 
biological mothers: her birth mother and her genetic mother. But seeJohnson v. Cal­
vert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (natural mother is gamete provider not birth mother). 
In discussing issues regarding contract pregnancy, I choose not to use the customary 
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respect for women's bodily integrity. Under choice rhetoric, a woman 
chooses to use contraception, abort a pre-viable fetus, or use alterna­
tive means of insemination based on her private circumstances. We 
all say that women, because of their status as humans, must have au­
thentic rights to bodily integrity ifwe, as women, are ever going to 
obtain meaningful equality in our society. For example, most femi­
nists have supported abortion in the terms ofchoice and bodily integ­
rity, viewing any restriction regarding pre-viability access to abortion as 
working against the goal of equality for women. I understand the im­
portance of the theory and the rhetoric, and in large part, I believe it. 
Because of the operation of patriarchy, women historically have not, 
and currently have, little control over their physical selves. One exam­
ple of this lack of control over our bodies is the fact that the law did 
not recognize marital rape as a crime until relatively recently.6 Le­
gally, women's bodies were not their own. Legally, women's bodies 
belonged to the men to whom they were legally attached.7 Women in 
abusive relationships continue to learn that their bodies are not their 
own, because the State has created so few mechanisms to enable wo­
men to authentically maintain control over their bodies.8 But given 
the history of women's lack of control over our bodies, it is not sur­
prising to any of us that "choice," choice with regard to what we do 
with our bodies, has become central to the feminist discussion of re­
productive rights. 
There are other reasons why "choice" has become such an impor­
tant political and rhetorical tool for North American feminists. 
Choice is an important part of classic liberalism - which assumes that 
all citizens have a zone of liberty in which to make intimate decisions.9 
Choosing when or whether to have children has long been deemed 
term for this technology because it explicitly labels the genetic mother, in the first 
instance, and the birth mother, in the second instance, as not the resulting child's 
"real" mother. Such a construction denigrates the work of pregnancy, as well as the 
emotional bonds women often form with the developing fetuses they carry. 
6. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45, 49 (1990) (In the 1980s, a handful of state judges held 
or opined in dicta that the marital rape exception constituted a denial of married 
women's constitutional right to equal protection.). See also MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, 
FEMINISM, MAfuuAGE, AND THE LAw IN V1croRIAN ENGLAND, 156-88, 1850-95 (1989) 
(examining the social and legal structures supporting battering and rape in late nine­
teenth century England). 
7. CJ. West, supra note 6, at 71 ("The marital rape exemption creates, fosters, and 
encourages ... a separate state of sovereignty ungoverned by law and insulated from 
state interference."). 
8. R. EMERsoN DoBASH AND RussELL P. DoBASH, WoMEN, VIOLENCE AND SoCIAL 
CHANGE (1992) (examining legal and social structures supporting the battering of 
women in the United States); see also Marie Fox, Legal Responses to Battered Women who 
Kill, in LAw AND BODY PoIITics: REGUIATING THE FEMALE BoDY ijo Bridgeman and 
Susan Millins eds., 1995) 171-200 (examining the adequacy of the response of the 
British justice system to battered women who kill their abusers). 
9. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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part of this liberty.10 The newer reproductive technologies seem to 
expand our vision ofwhat liberty and choice mean. With technology, 
reproductive liberty can become not only the right to have or not to 
have a child, but the right to have a child by any technologically avail­
able means.II As Janet Dolgin noted: "reproductive technology, sim­
ply by unfolding, invites human beings to become increasingly 
autonomous, and to enter into a range of contracts that may prove 
unlimited. It thus invites, and values, choice. "I2 As a result, it also 
values the principles of classic liberalism, which values autonomy with­
out reference to the effects that the exercise of autonomy has on 
others, and without reference to the conditions under which choices 
are made.I3 So even though the political and rhetorical utility of 
choice is problematic, choice has nevertheless been an important part 
of our feminist fight for the control of our bodies. 
Because reproductive rights for women are so tenuous and are 
increasingly more vulnerable,I4 it has been difficult for feminists to 
seriously discuss the wisdom of the "choice" rhetoric we use when dis­
cussing access to abortion or access to any of the new emerging repro­
ductive technologies.I5 I have been thinking about this issue, 
specifically with regard to feminist responses to sex-selective abor­
tion. I6 For example, although feminist ethicist Tabitha Powledge un­
derstands that in the context of sex-selection of children, to prefer 
males is unavoidably to denigrate females,I7 she nevertheless takes the 
10. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation is a funda­
mental right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception is a fundamen­
tal right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion of non-viable fetus is a 
fundamental right); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 
S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (right to abortion is a liberty interest) (O'Connor, Kennedy 
& Souter,JJ.). 
11. See, e.g., John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pref!> 
narwy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 410 (1983). 
12. Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" ofReproduction: Reproductive Technologies and the 
Parent-child Bond, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1261, 1272 (1994). 
13. Cf. SPALLONE, supra note 4, at 81 ("[W)e similarly hear the argument that 
women should have the 'free' choice to become 'surrogates' ifwe wanted. But what 
does that mean? One swvey showed that 40 percent of women who became 'surro­
gate' mothers were unemployed or on welfare."). 
14. See generally, Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (decreasing the standard of review of reg­
ulations restricting abortion to an "undue burden" review). 
15. Tabitha Powledge, Toward A Moral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEX SELECTION OF 
CHU..DREN 201, 207 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983). 
16. See April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex Selective Abortion: Sol.ely a 
Matter of Choice?, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 161 (1996). For other approaches to the issue 
of sex-selection and the law, seeJodi Danis, Sexism and "the Superfluous Female": ATgU­
ments for Regulating Pre-Implantation Sex Sel.ection, 18 HARv. WoMEN's LJ. 219 (1995); 
OwenJones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination ofa Child's 
Gender, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1992); George Schedler, Benign Sex Discrimination Re­
visited: Constitutional and Moral Issues in Banning Sex-Sel.ection Abortion, 15 !'EPP. L. REv. 
295 (1988). 
17. Powledge, supra note 15, at 207. 
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position vis-a-vis sex-selection, that in order to protect the improve­
ments women have already achieved, "society should seek no legal re­
strictions on reproductive freedom, even on a technology that will be 
used selectively against females. "18 Powledge says that although she 
"recognize[s] its irony, [she] view[s] this position as part of the price 
of furthering the goal of equal treatment."19 
The problem here is that our reliance on choice creates a situa­
tion in which substantive outcomes are subordinated to process neu­
trality. In other words, substantive equality is secondary to formal 
equality, even though we know that formal equality has often allowed 
deep substantive oppression and subordination to continue.2° For ex­
ample, asJanice Raymond has noted, "[c]hoice resonates as a quintes­
sential U.S. value, set in a context of a social history that has gradually 
allowed all sorts of oppressive so-called options, such as prostitution 
[and] pornography, ... to be defended in the name ofwomen's right 
to choose."21 We allow people to make decisions, "choices," regard­
less of the outcome. This classical liberal position protects individuals 
from unwarranted government intrusion into decisions regarding the 
private sphere, but it does not require nor does it encourage individu­
als to behave in ways that further the interests of the community.22 
The subordination of substantive outcomes to process neutrality (or 
to choice) does not necessarily promote women's interests in equality. 
Thus, by focusing on the process of whether bodily integrity and 
choice are protected, we fail to pay close attention to the substantive 
outcome - the abortion of female fetuses - or the denigration of 
women as a social group. 
So we have a dilemma - feminism has traditionally stressed the 
importance of women's control over their bodies and reproductive 
control in achieving social, political, and economic equality.23 Sex­
selective abortion, like other "new" reproductive technologies, poses 
challenges to this traditional feminist position. I think that the use of 
newer reproductive technologies presents difficulties for traditional 
feminist thought in this area because the effects of an individual wo­
man's use of the technology goes beyond herself in ways that are po­
tentially dangerous/negative, not just for the woman using the 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See CA.TIJARINE MAc'KINNoN, THE SEXUAL liARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 
(1979). 
21. JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN As WoMBS ix-x (1993). 
22. The classic liberal legal tradition is keenly connected to the classic liberal 
political tradition associated with the works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, 
which are committed to a formal or procedural conception ofjustice rather than a 
conception of law in which substantive justice is deemed more or as significant. Karl 
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization ofthe Wagner Act and the Origins ofModern Legal Conscious­
ness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 276-77 n.38 (1978). 
23. RosALIND Pol.I.ACK. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WoMAN's CHOICE: THE STATE, 
SEXUALTIY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 289-302 (1985). 
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technology, but for women as a social group. In the case of sex-selec­
tive abortion, and other reproductive technologies, "the paradox 
posed by individual choices eventually alter[s] every woman's experi­
ence of maternity and motherhood."24 Use of sex-selective pre-con­
ception and post-conception techniques, for example, is the result of, 
and becomes one of the causes of, the denigration of women. Boys 
are chosen over girls because of what it means to be a girl in society. 
Girls are devalued.25 Sex-selective abortion also decreases the number 
ofwomen born. We know from research that in societies where men 
greatly outnumber women, women are heavily restricted in both pri­
vate and public activity.26 In our analyses of the newer reproductive 
technologies, we need to remain cognizant that the technical means 
heralded as liberating women's choice are always limited by the social, 
political, and economic forces that constrain women's "free choice." 
RIGHTS AND RIGHTS-TALK 
As a society, we often talk about rights as a solution for the ine­
quality we face. I believe that this is true, particularly of those of us 
who are members of historically and contemporarily oppressed and 
vilified groups, such as African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, women of 
all races and ethnic groups, lesbians and gay men, and poor people. 
As critical race scholar Patricia Williams has explained regarding Afri­
can-Americans: "For the historically disempowered, the conferring of 
rights is symbolic of all of the denied aspects of their humanity: rights 
imply a respect that places one in the referential range of self and 
others, that elaborates one's status from human body to social be­
ing."27 Furthermore, historically, the assertion of needs, in addition 
24. Laura R Woliver, The Deflective Puwer ofReproductive Technologi£s: The Impact on 
Women, 9 WOMEN AND POL. 17, 19-20 (1989). 
25. See, e.g., Nancy E. Williamson, Boys or Girls? Parental Preference and Sex Contra~ 
33 POPULATION BuLL. 13-14 (1978) (sex preference reflects the roles that women and 
men or boys and girls play in the society). 
26. Women in societies with such unbalanced sex ratios suffer from substantial 
constraints on their behavior, such as significant penalties for non-virginity before 
state recognized marriage, proscriptions against adultery, extensive control by men 
over their wives and daughters, and the marriage of girls and women at younger ages. 
See MARCIA GUTrENTAG AND PAUL SECORD, Too MANY WoMEN? THE SEX RA.no QuEs­
TION 79 (1983). Women in these societies are also endangered by female infanticide 
and neglect, and by strong sex role ideologies, which socially and legally require wo­
men to behave according to models of submission and subordination. See Susan 
Greenhalgh and Jiali Li, Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China: 
For a Feminist Demography ofReproduction, 20 SIGNS:J. WoMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 601, 
601 (1995). For a fuller analysis see Cherry, supra note 16, at 168-75. 
27. PATRICIA]. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND R:rcHrS: DIARY OF ALAw PROFES­
SOR 153 (1991). See also RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 192 (movement from body to 
social being is also relevant in women's struggle for reproductive justice). 
Feminist legal scholar Fran Olsen has also noted that "[a]s exhortation, the state­
ment that women have rights is an assertion about the kind of society we want to live 
in, the kind of relations among people we wish to foster, and the kind ofbehavior that 
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to the assertion of rights, or in place of the assertion of rights, as advo­
cated by critical legal studies scholars, has been unsuccessful for disen­
franchised groups in our society. Again, Williams notes: "For blacks, 
describing needs has been a dismal failure as political activity .... The 
history of our need is certainly moving enough to have been called 
poetry, oratory and epic entertainment, but it has never been treated 
by white institutions as a statement of political priority."28 
As a result of these observations, critical race theorists, as well as 
other scholars of color, have encouraged the fight for rights. Rights, 
they have found, serve a dual purpose. Rights "facilitate our access to 
a variety oflegal norms and enforcement mechanisms by which we try 
to indicate ... important claims, "29 and are useful "to mobilize sup­
port for a particular agenda."30 As critical race theoristJohn Calmore 
observes: "Until the subjugated group feels a sense ofmoral outrage, 
the group will almost certainly fail to resist the injustice that is op­
pressing it."31 Feminist scholar Elizabeth Schneider has also noted 
that rights talk can "provide a sense ofself-hood and collective identity 
and start a political conversation."32 For example, rights and rights­
talk. have empowered women as a social group by giving some women 
power, although limited, over whether and when they choose mother­
hood. Rights discourse in this context served to foster political educa­
tion and organization.33 As a result, rights discourse was used to 
facilitate justice. 
Hence, rights and rights rhetoric can only be useful if they are 
not separated from issues of social justice and other ethical concerns. 
In the reproductive area, our focus on individual rights has sometimes 
allowed us to neglect larger issues of social need and justice. 
Many radical feminists are critical of rights-talk due to its justifica­
tions of state power based on the enforcement of individual rights.34 
Rights and claims to rights are part of the patriarchal system of law 
which is represented by the belief in the importance of "objectivity, 
distance and abstraction. "35 As a result, rights-talk tends to delegi­
is to be praised or blamed. The assertion that women have rights is a moral claim 
about how human beings should act toward one another." Frances Olsen, Statutory 
Rape: A Feminist Critique ofRights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. RE.v. 387, 391 (1984). See also 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women '.s 
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 611 (1986) (rights discourse can express human and 
communal values). 
28. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reccmstructing Ideals from Deconstructed 
Rights, 22 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. RE.v. 401, 412 (1987). 
29. John 0. Galmore, Critical Race Theury, Archie Shepp and Fire Music Securing an 
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 2129, 2211 (1992). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. (footnote omitted). 
32. Schneider, supra note 27, at 623. 
33. Id. at 622-23. 
34. See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 191. 
35. Schneider, supra note 27, at 597, 600; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marx­
ism, Method, and the State: TuwardFeminist]urisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CUI.TURE 
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tunize women's experience of the world, such as their treatment 
under the law governing reproductive technologies, and the impor­
tance of women's material needs.36 Rights-talk under patriarchy has 
lead to the emergence of maternal-fetal conflicts in both medicine 
and law, in which physicians and judges favor fetal interests over the 
pregnant woman's non-consent or the pregnant woman's freedom.37 
Rights-talk has helped us get to a place where we discuss the rights of 
the free floating fetus as though the fetus were not attached to a wo­
man's womb.38 "Sooner or later we have to expose rights-based per­
spectives . . . for what they are (in part): a poorly disguised way of 
preserving things just as they are."39 
Even in light of the criticism placed on the value of rights in our 
society, rights and rights discourse have been, and will continue to be, 
useful to disenfranchised groups in our struggle for a just society. 
Rights-talk speaks to the interpretive community. It speaks in the lan­
guage of those who hold power.40 In order for any dissenting view to 
be seriously considered in legal discourse, those in control must un­
derstand the claims of the dispossessed and take those claims seri­
ously. Nevertheless, rights discourse, as currently framed by 
liberalism, merely permits reform. It will never allow the destruction 
of patriarchy and hence will never allow the radical changes needed 
to truly transform women's social and political status. Individual 
rights are the "tools of a racist patriarchy," to use Audre Lorde's meta­
& Soc'v 635, 655 (1983) (Law "not only reflects a society in which men rule women; it 
rules in a male way."). 
36. With respect ofsexuality, Fran Olsen notes: "As an analytic tool, the concept 
that women have rights seems powerful but in practice it turns out not to be helpful; 
it cannot answer any difficult questions. [With regard to sexuality] [ w]omen's right to 
freedom of action conflicts with their right to security; their right to substantive equal­
ity conflicts with their right to formal equality." Olsen, supra note 27, at 391. See also 
Calmore, supra note 29, at 2215 ("Th[e] process whereby rights are defined by law, 
however, is substantially isolated from the very needs that generated those rights and 
the values they envisaged."). 
37. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 11, at 437-64 (arguing for a legal preference 
for fetal interests over maternal freedom during pregnancy, labor and delivery); Ra­
leigh Fitkin v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (NJ. 1964) (fetus entitled to benefits of blood 
transfusion despite pregnant woman's refusal);Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County 
Hospital Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). See also I'ETCHESKY, supra note 23, at 
352-53 (growing number of ob/gyn practitioners view the fetus' as their patient in­
dependent of the woman who carries it). But see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 
1990) (en bane) (recognizing a pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity as against 
the state's interest in protecting the fetus). 
38. For a fuller analysis of this phenomenon see, e.g., I'ETCHESKY, supra note 23, at 
334-35. 
39. RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 191 (quoting Sherene Razack, "Wrong Rights: Femi­
nism Applied to Law, 10 LE BuLLETIN I NEWSLETI'ER, lNSTITUT S™oNE DE BEAuvom 13 
(1990)). 
40. Cf. Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin ofPraperty, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 84-85, 
88 (1985) (common law theory ofpossession gives preference to those who articulate 
their intentions in a specific vocabulary and in a structure that is approved of and 
understood by those in power). 
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phor, and "will never dismantle the master's house."41 In order for 
rights to be truly transformative, rights discourse must emphasize the 
interdependence of autonomy and community, and be connected to 
the struggle for social justice.42 
CHOICE, RIGHTS, AND THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT IN 

THE AREA OF REPRODUCTION 

So given the problematic nature of choice and rights rhetoric, 
what do we do? In order to ethically support rights in the reproduc­
tive arena, feminists must seek to ensure that the rights sought do not 
create new forms of subordination for women of any race or class, or 
for members of other subordinated groups.43 Feminism must con­
sider whether the right to choose any of the emerging reproductive 
technologies increases women's reproductive freedom or increases 
the exploitation of women's reproductive capacities. Feminism must 
also consider the ways in which reproductive technologies will affect 
the value or status ofwomen in this gender-based society. Even many 
feminists who have argued against the legal regulation of reproductive 
technologies have recognized that the principle of freedom of choice 
(liberty) must be second to the principles of social fairness and anti­
subordination (substantive equality) ifwomen's subordination is to be 
reduced or eradicated.44 There must be a point at which the rights of 
individual women impinge so strongly on women as a social group 
that social or legal regulation is required.45 Therefore, if rights-talk is 
to be a useful tool offe~t discourse in this area, freedom ofchoice 
must be weighed against the commitment to ending subordination.46 
In the final analysis, rights discourse must include an understand­
ing of the historical and contemporary injustices towards women, as 
well as an understanding of women's social training in patriarchy 
41. AUDRE LoRDE, The Master's Tools will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SIS­
TER OursmER 110-13 (1984). 
42. See Schneider, supra note 27, at 611. 
43. Cf. MariJ. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 
S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1771 (1990). 
44. See, e.g., Powledge, supra note 15; Roberta Steinbacher & Helen B. Holmes, 
Sex Choice: Suruival and Sisterhood, in MAN-MADE WoMEN 52, 61 (Gena Corea et. al. 
eds., 1987). 
45. See Robyn Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of 
'Choice' in Sex Preselection, in MAN-MADE WoMEN, supra note 44, at 74, 84. 
46. Several feminist and critical race scholars have stressed the importance of an 
anti-subordination principle in the quest for equality, and in their critique of liberal 
rights-talk. See, e.g., CATHARINE A MAcK!NNoN, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 215-34 (1989); Robin West, supra note 6; MariJ. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and 
Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in P/.owed Up Ground, 11 HARv. WoMEN's LJ. 1 (1988); 
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1003 (1986). 
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which often requires women to collude with patriarchy to our own 
disadvantage.47 As Rosalind Petchesky has stated: 
The "right to choose" means ve:ry little when women are powerless 
.... Women make their own reproductive choices, but they do not 
make them just as they please; they do not make them under condi­
tions which they themselves create, but under social conditions and 
constraints which they, as mere individuals, are powerless to 
change.48 
Hence, when considering issues of substantive justice and their con­
nection to ethical considerations, we must consider whether rights­
talk fully considers the social, economic and political contexts in 
which women make "choices" concerning the abortion of gendered 
(female) fetuses. 
CONCLUSION 
Many reproductive rights, such as the right to buy and use contra­
ception and the right to choose abortion, gave women with economic 
resources power and control over their lives. These rights allowed wo­
men to choose more freely, to decide whether and when to have chil­
dren. Women with financial resources no longer had to continue 
unplanned pregnancies or have back-alley abortions.49 These rights 
emphasized the interdependence of individual liberty and communal 
justice. Giving women the choice to continue or terminate a preg­
nancy was a choice which had the potential to destroy male control of 
women's sexuality and reproductive lives. 
Sex-selective abortion, however, is different because its conse­
quences do not result in the dismantling of patriarchal domination. 
We have seen that the overwhelming majority of women who make 
choices regarding sex-selective abortion make the choice to destroy 
the female fetus.50 Thus, while abortion gives women control over 
47. For example, through personal service (homemaking), sexual service (per­
forming intercourse and having children), and ego service (encouragement and at­
tention) to men, women expend much of their creative energies and limit their own 
career and creative choices. See MARILYN FRYE, Dppressicn, in THE PoLrTics OF REAI.rIY: 
EssAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 9 (1983); and ADRIENNE RICH, OF WoMAN BoRN: MoTIIER­
HOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 279-80 (1976). 
48. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Reproductive Freedom: Beyond "a Woman '.s Right to 
Choose," 5 SIGNS: J. WoMEN IN CULTURE & Sec'y 661, 674-5, (1980) (quoting KARL 
MARx, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LouIS BoNAPARTE 15 (1963)). 
49. Because of the severe limitations on federal funding for abortion, many poor 
women have been forced to continue unplanned pregnancies or have abortions per­
formed by unlicensed providers. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde 
Amendment, which restricts federal funding for most abortions for poor women, held 
constitutional). 
50. For example, a joint committee of the Indian Parliament found that during 
the period of 1986-87, as many as 50,000 female fetuses were aborted after sex identi­
fication tests were performed. Ajoy Bose, Abortion: Who Belieues in a Woman's Right to 
Choose?, GUARDIAN FEATURES, Aug. 11, 1992, at 15. 
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whether and when to have children, sex-selective abortion gives fami­
lies5I control over the sexual composition of future generations. Sex­
selective abortion increases the opportunities for gender discrimina­
tion.s2 Instead of reducing the subordination ofwomen and girls, sex­
selective abortion increases women's social, economic, political and 
reproductive exploitation. 
51. Much of the medical literature discusses the ethical use of the new reproduc­
tive technologies in terms of the impact on "couples" and the impact on society, 
thereby exhibiting an explicit understanding that the decision of whether to use a 
new reproductive technology is not based on the woman's interest in reproduction. 
See, e.g., THE Ennes CoMMITrEE OF THE AMERICAN FERTILrIY SoCIETY, EnnCAL CoNsm­
ERATIONS OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1986); MARY WARNOCK, A QuES­
TION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN F'ERTil.ISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 
(1984). 
52. See generally Cheny, supra note 16. 
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